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MOSES V PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL: THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT DUMPS THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS
OF THE PATIENT ANTI-DUMPING STATUTE
W. Adam Malizio*
I. INTRODUCTION
The cost of treating medical patients has grown rapidly during the last
fifty years, with the United States currentl' having, per capita, the most
expensive healthcare system in the world. During the middle to late
twentieth century, many hospitals focused on a patient's ability to pay for
treatment rather than the patient's actual medical condition; in many cases,
meeting a proof-of-payment burden was the initial hurdle to be seen by a
physician. 3  Hospitals routinely turned away patients who complained of
acute medical issues if those patients did not demonstrate their ability to
* J.D., The Catholic University of America, May 2010. The author would like to
thank Aditi ihaveri as well as his parents, Ann and Drew Malizio, for all of their
unyielding support in life. The author would also like to thank the staff and editors of
The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy, especially Jessica Katz of Volume
XXVII and Shant Boyajian of Volume XXVI for their input, dedication, and patience.
Finally, the author would like to thank Jill Wright for her help and advice in the
production of this Note.
1. See Earl D. Hoffman, Jr. et al, Brief Summaries of Medicare & Medicaid, Title
XVIII andXIX of the Social Security Act, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 1, 4
(Nov. 1, 2008), http://www.cms.gov/MedicareProgramRatesStats/downloads/Medicare
MedicaidSummaries2008.pdf (noting that health care costs have increased "[f]rom $27.5
billion in 1960 . .. to $912.6 billion in 1993" and increased "at an average rate of 11.2
percent annually").
2. See Thomas Bodenheimer, High and Rising Healthcare Costs Part 1: Seeking an
Explanation, 142 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 847, 850 (2005) (comparing per capita
income averages with per capita healthcare expenditures and showing that the United
States far surpasses all other nations as having the most expensive healthcare costs).
3. See 131 CONG. REC. 35,813 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985) (statement of Rep. Fortney
Stark) (explaining that the practice of determining whether a patient could pay for
medical treatment has been dubbed by some as a "wallet biopsy").
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pay.4 Even in recent cases, hospital emergency rooms hired taxicabs to
drive untreated patients to other hospitals (usually public ones), or had the
driver simply desert the ill patient in impoverished areas. This act of
turning away patients complaining of emergency medical ailments due to
their inability to pay has become known as "patient dumping." 6 The term
"patient dumping" can refer to a wide range of acts: a hospital's outright
refusal to provide necessary emergency medical care; a hospital's
unwillingness to provide sufficient and stabilizing medical care before
arranging to transport the individual to another facility; or, perhaps the most
shocking, a hospital's solicitation of drivers to abandon patients on the side
of the road. 7
As the public became aware of the widespread patient-dumping practices
of hospitals across the nation, many pushed for some type of Congressional
action.8  Congress had already addressed the question of whether the
government could compel a public hospital to treat patients that show up at
its doors in the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, commonly
known as the Hill-Burton Act.9 Congress also addressed the minimum
4. See Karen 1. Treiger, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's
Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1186 (1986) (providing four specific examples of
patients being denied emergency medical services during the early 1980s due to their lack
of health insurance).
5. See Richard Winton and Cara DiMassa. L.A. Files Patient 'Dumping' Charges,
L.A. TIMEs (Nov. 16, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/nov/16/local/me-dumpingl6
(describing how video surveillance showed taxi cabs leaving psychiatric patients on
"Skid Row" in Los Angeles while the patients were still dressed in hospital gowns).
6. See EDWARD C. Liu, EMTALA: ACCESS TO EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE, CRS-1,
n.2 (Cong. Research Serv. 2008) (explaining that "'patient dumping' occurs when a
hospital turns away indigent or uninsured persons seeking treatment so that the hospital
will not have to absorb the cost of treating them").
7. See 131 CONG. REC. 35,813 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985) (statement of Rep. Fortney
Stark); see also Winton and DiMassa, supra note 5. Additionally, as discussed in Part V
of this Note, there appears to be a problem in appropriately defining the scope of "patient
dumping" in the federal statutes and regulations addressing the issue. See infra Part V.
8. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. III, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
726, 726 (describing the "growing concerns" over hospitals' denial of emergency medical
care to the uninsured and indigent populations).
9. The Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040
(1946) Hill-Burton Program, Title VI and Title XVI (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). Included in the Hill-Burton Act is the allotment of federal
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medical treatment that must be provided to patients covered under the
Medicare system in the Social Security Act of 1965.10 But reliance on these
Acts to ensure treatment for all patients with emergency medical conditions
was no longer practical as of the 1980s because the Hill-Burton Act only
applies to those state-funded hospitals participating in the Hill-Burton
program,' while the Social Security Act of 1965 primarily covers elderly
patients seeking emergency medical care. 12  In an effort to address the
problem of patient dumping on a broad scale, Congress passed the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) in 1986.13
While EMTALA provides patients who are improperly turned away from
emergency departments with a federal claim against the hospital,
controversy has arisen over whether a hospital has satisfied the requirements
of EMTALA once it admits an emergency room patient into inpatient care.
This Note seeks to provide insight into EMTALA, and the scope of
federal regulations of this Act. Part II of this Note analyzes the major
provisions of EMTALA and seeks to ascertain the general legislative intent
of the 99th Congress. Part III addresses the initial split among the federal
circuits regarding the application of the Act to inpatients admitted through a
hospital's emergency department. Part IV analyzes the proposed and final
attempts by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to cure
the split in interpretations through the issuance of regulations interpreting
the Act. Part V presents and critiques the recent holding in Moses v.
financing to state-funded hospitals in order to make "available in the facility or portion
thereof to be constructed or modernized a reasonable volume of services to persons
unable to pay therefor . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2003). Failure to comply with the
provisions of the Act would result in a withholding of federal funding to the
noncompliant state hospital programs. § 291g(e).
10. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965).
The benefits of the Medicare system are established in the Health Insurance for the Aged
Act. Pub. L. No. 89-97 § 100, Subchapter XVIII (1964) (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). Part A of the Act provides government-backed insurance for
persons over sixty-five who are hospitalized. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (2003). Part B of the
Act provides government-backed personal or supplemental health care insurance for
persons over sixty-five. § 1395j.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 291c.
12. § 1395o(2).
13. Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, Title IX, § 9121(b), 100 Stat. 82, 164 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of multiple chapters of U.S.C.).
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Providence Hospital and Medical Centers, Inc., whereby the Sixth Circuit
refused to give deference to CMS' implementing regulations. Finally, Part
VI provides one possible and workable amendment to the federal statute,
which would appropriately mend the differences between CMS and the
Sixth Circuit.
II. THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ACTIVE LABOR ACT
During the mid-1980s, Congress sought to alleviate the growing problem
of patient dumping by relying on the principal government healthcare
system, the Medicare and Medicaid programs.' 5  As part of its larger
Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1986,16
Congress passed EMTALA to address the practice of patient dumping in
Medicare-participating hospitals. Because EMTALA created a new
federal cause of action and allowed for significant civil monetary penalties
against Medicare-participating hospitals, EMTALA effectively reached a
significant portion of the private hospitals that the Hill-Burton Act could not.
At its most basic level, EMTALA requires that all hospitals participating
with CMS reimbursement programs "provide for an appropriate medical
screening examination" to all persons who "come to the emergency
department."l 9  It goes on to state that if an emergency condition is
determined to exist, "the hospital must provide . . . for such further medical
examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical
condition," 20 before transferring the patient to another facility.21 Under
14. 561 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2009).
15. In 1986, Medicare and Medicaid were managed by the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) of the Department of Health and Human Services. This division
has since been renamed the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 3.
16. § 9121(b), 100 Stat. 82(1986).
17. H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. 1, at 27 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579,
605.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d).
19. § 1395dd(a).
20. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A).
21. § 1395dd(c)(1). An exception to this rule applies only when the patient makes an
informed request for a transfer, if a physician certifies that the benefits associated with
216
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EMTALA, the patient is stabilized when "no material deterioration of the
condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to result from or
occur during the transfer."22 Whether the stabilization requirement
continues indefinitely or is extinguished upon admitting the patient to the
hospital for inpatient care is unclear in the statutory language, and, as
discussed below, has caused a major division among the federal circuits.
A. Congressional Intent
While it is largely preferred that statutory interpretation be done using the
language of the statute itself,23 when the plain language causes divergent
understandings and interpretations, it is necessary to look to the legislative
history of a statute to find its true meaning.24 Ascertaining the legislative
intent behind EMTALA is difficult because the Act was only a small part of
COBRA.25 There was little floor discussion of COBRA's EMTALA
provisions in either the House or Senate during the First Session of the 99th
Congress, and only two committee reports were produced on the matter.26
Because of the lack of significant legislative history, discerning the general
policy that the 99th Congress sought to further arguably provides better
insight into the overall intent of EMTALA. In order to find the overarching
policy behind the Act, it is important to parse through the few floor
comments and committee reports related to the EMTALA amendment of
COBRA to determine whether it advanced any specifically announced
policies.
the transfer outweigh the associated risks, or if no physician is present in the transferring
hospital. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A). In any of these cases, the receiving hospital must have
space for the patient and consent to the transfer. § 1395dd(c)(2)(B).
22. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B).
23. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) ("The
starting point for every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.").
24. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 507 (1982)
(discussing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to determine statutory
intent and accuracy of prior Supreme Court interpretations of the statute).
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd (2003).
26. See generally H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. Ill, at 4-9; H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. 1, at
27-29.
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The most significant commentary on EMTALA came from California
Representative Fortney Stark, a sponsor of the Amendment.27 In his floor
statement, Rep. Stark recounted two specific incidents of patient dumping,
and opined that, "if these patients had been middle class with health
insurance they never would have faced the horrors that they encountered." 28
He proceeded to outline the provisions of EMTALA that were eventually
adopted in the Act.29 He also proposed significant civil and criminal fines
against physicians who violated the Act's standard of care provisions.30
Representative Stark's only stated purpose for enactinI these provisions was
"to prevent this kind of dumping of indigent patients."
The two House committee reports related to the EMTALA provisions,
which should be the main source used to discern the primary intent of the
99th Congress when drafting the Act, actually add little to the overall motive
32
asserted by Representative Stark. The Committee on Ways and Means
produced a report that generally adopted the proposed language of the
EMTALA Amendment to COBRA. The Committee asserted that the goal
of the statute was to ensure that hospitals did not "ignore traditional
community responsibilities and loosen historic standards."3 4  It based this
belief on the notion that hospitals were engaging in patient dumping as a
response to "pressures for greater hospital efficiency" through the
prospective payment system.35
27. See generally 131 Cong. Rec., 35,813, supra note 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. III, at 7 (discussing the criminal sanctions
in the proposed language of EMTALA).
31. See 131 Cong. Rec., 35,813, supra note 3.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. III, at 6; see also H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. 1.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. I, at 27-28 (accepting the overall purpose and
language of the proposed amendment without making any recommendations to change its
wording).
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id. The Prospective Payment System sets fixed values that CMS will reimburse
a hospital or physician for certain medical procedures. See OVERVIEW OF PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT SYSTEMS-GENERAL INFORMATION, http://www.cms.gov/prospmedicare
feesvcpmtgen (last visited Aug. 12, 2010).
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Although the Judiciary Committee took a much harder stance against the
criminal sanctions in the proposed Act,36 it maintained the same general
policy intent expressed in the report from the Committee on Ways and
Means.37 The Judiciary Committee's report and final amendments to the
statute focused on the proposed penalties that it deemed to be "too severe,"
and asserted that "some hospitals, particularly those located in rural or poor
areas, may decide to close their emergency rooms entirely rather than risk
the civil fines, damage awards, and, as to physicians, criminal penalties that
might ensue." 38 The Judiciary Committee's proposed amendments were
designed to ensure the "major goal of the section" remained "an increase in
[available medical] care," and, as drafted, would provide civil fines against
physicians to deter violations of EMTALA, including causes of actions for
patients and hospitals impacted by another hospital's patient dumping, and
remove the criminal penalties for violations of the Act.39 The policy the
Committee sought to further in EMTALA was to "respond to the medical
needs of individuals with emergency medical conditions and women in
active labor." 40 When juxtaposed with the policy of EMTALA noted by the
Committee on Ways and Means, the policy of the Judiciary Committee is,
for all intents and purposes, the same: to provide emergency medical
assessment and necessary treatment to all those who request it.4 1
36. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. III, at 7 ("The Committee deleted the criminal
sanction because . . . it is unnecessary, and unwise, and raises serious Constitutional
questions under the due process clause.").
37. See id. at 6.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 6, 7.
40. Id. at 6.
41. Compare id. at 6 (demonstrating that the intent of EMTALA is to "respond to the
medical needs of individuals with emergency medical conditions and women in active
labor") with H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. I, at 27 (asserting that EMTALA will ensure
hospitals do not "ignore traditional responsibilities" by requiring these hospitals "to
provide an appropriate medical screening examination and treatment for any individual
who requests it [and] . . . to determine whether an emergency medical condition exists or
if the patient is in active labor").
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B. The Continued Need for EMTALA under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010
In light of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(Affordable Care Act), it is important to note a few characteristic features of
EMTALA that demonstrate why there is continued need for its protections
and why the recent reforms do not replace the patient safeguards provided
by EMTALA. First, EMTALA acts as the bare minimum of what
acceptable actions hospital emergency departments may take. It provides
the absolute minimum procedural standards for hospitals responding to a
person seeking emergency care.42 Second, EMTALA prevents a patient's
health insurance coverage from being considered as part of the medical
triage performed by a hospital's emergency department.43 Third, by acting
as the minimum threshold of what is acceptable, EMTALA presumes that
hospitals will normally function well above the procedural standards it
mandates." What these characteristics demonstrate is that EMTALA
functions irrespective of whether a patient has health care insurance or not.45
42. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)(i) (2009) (stating simply that a hospital must
"[p]rovide an appropriate medical examination within the capability of the hospital's
emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available to the emergency
department," but not providing any further details about the examination requirements).
EMTALA generally does not provide the process or method of medical care that an
emergency department must follow before it is liable. This can be seen in its broad
definitions of the medical terms included in the statute. EMTALA simply directs
hospitals to follow certain procedural steps while leaving exactly what medical care is
needed to the discretion of the physician. In so doing, it cannot act as a medical
malpractice statute. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. III, at 8 (suggesting that criminal
penalties in EMTALA would be improper because the statute requires only an
"appropriate medical screening examination" without providing specific requirements of
this screening).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (asserting that it applies to any person who seeks
emergency medical care, regardless of his or her status as a Medicare recipient).
44. See Morgan v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 458 F.Supp. 2d 1341, 1350 (S.D. Ala.
2006) (applying the principle of good faith as the applicable standard for EMTALA
claims).
45. A key element of the federal health care reform bill is that nearly all persons in
the United States will obtain some form of health insurance by 2014. See generally
House Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and
Labor, Affordable Healthcare for America Summary (March 23, 2010), http://waysand
means.house.gov/Media/pdfl I 1/HCare/2010_SUMMARY.pdf. However, while there
are some provisions of the Act that require coverage of the costs of emergency medical
services, there is no unified determination of what exact services must be covered. See
220
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The act of patient dumping may be driven by a hospital's concern over a
patient's ability to pay, but the language of EMTALA restricts the transfer of
any unstable patient seeking emergency care, regardless of the hospital's
46
motive for such an improper patient transfer. Furthermore, Medicare and
Medicaid are paying out less to participating hospitals while patient visits to
emergency departments are increasing.47 Thus, with the Affordable Care
Act expanding Medicaid coverage while seeking to reduce overall CMS
spending,4 8 patient dumping and the need for patient protection in
emergency departments is an ongoing concern.
EMTALA may also provide a balance between two potential viewpoints
regarding the impact of the Affordable Care Act of 2010. Optimists might
argue that government-regulated health insurance will end patient dumping,
making EMTALA obsolete. On the other hand, pessimists might counter
that patient dumping based on private health insurance being favored over
government subsidized plans will become the status quo. Even though
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(1), 124 Stat.
119, 163 (2010) (leaving the Secretary of Health and Human Services to define the
minimum scope of coverage for qualifying plans). This will likely result in certain, less
expensive insurance plans, which cover less diagnostic and therapeutic procedures and
can potentially result in favoritism and preference contracts between hospitals and
specific insurance providers. The system of "exchanges" established in the Act might
cause insurance providers to cut down on the level of coverage in an effort to drive down
costs, though certain "qualification" minimums must be met. Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act § 1311 (d)(2)(B)(1); H.R. 3590 § 1311(b). Thus, rather than a
system where the uninsured are the bane to private hospitals, a system where the
underinsured are targets for patient dumping could be emerging. See, e.g., Kevin Sack,
As Medicaid Payments Shrink, Patients are Abandoned, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, at
Al (showing the difficulty in finding physicians that will accept appointments from
patients covered through Medicaid programs).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) ("[1]f any individual . . . comes to the emergency
department and a request is made on the individual's behalf for examination . . . the
hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination . . . .") (emphasis
added).
47. Jeffery Kahntroff and Rochelle Watson, Refusal of Emergency Care and Patient
Dumping, 11 AM. MED. Assc. J. ETHICS 49, 51 (2009).
48. See RICHARD S. FOSTER, Estimated Financial Effects ofthe "Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, " as Amended, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 8
(2010), https://www.cms.gov/Actuarial Studies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf
(stating that the Medicare savings under the Act would be caused by a decrease in
spending of Parts A and B of Medicare coverage).
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nearly all Americans will now be required to carry some form of health care
insurance, EMTALA would continue to play a significant role in protecting
patient rights by providing the patient with some type of legal relief should a
CMS-participating hospital engage in patient dumping.49 Finally, because
the role of CMS remains prominent in the Affordable Care Act,5 0 CMS will
remain an effective tool to encourage and enforce EMTALA compliance.
III. THE INITIAL DIVIDE OVER APPLYING EMTALA TO INPATIENTS
Whether EMTALA applies to individuals who present to the hospital with
an emergency medical condition, but are then admitted to the hospital for
ongoing care, has caused a wide split among the federal circuits. To
illustrate this divide, consider the following hypothetical: A middle-aged
female feels a sudden onset of chest pain while she is at home. Upon the
patient's arrival at her local hospital's emergency department, the hospital's
staff recognizes the patient is suffering from an acute myocardial infarction
(a "heart attack") and administers the appropriate intravenous medications.
The emergency department physician then admits the patient into the
hospital's cardiac unit. Her vital signs remain inconsistent for the next two
days, whereupon additional tests reveal her infarction has worsened and is
nearly complete. The on-call cardiologist reviews the patient's chart,
discovering she will need the implantation of a stint. The patient's medical
insurance does not cover the use of the type of stint the hospital uses, as it is
coated in an experimental antibiotic, but does cover stints used at a nearby
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) (providing a federal cause of action for any person
harmed by a physician's or hospital's failure to comply with EMTALA provisions).
Consider also the situation of "frequent fliers," who may inundate a hospital's emergency
department for every minor medical situation that arises. See Dave Jamieson, The
Treatment of Kenny Farnsworth, WASH. POST MAGAZINE, Nov. 29, 2009, at 17
(describing the use of emergency departments as primary care facilities for some
patients). Patient's discouraged by long waits at primary care facilities may, and often
do, turn to emergency departments for medical care regardless of their insurance status.
Frustrated by these patients, some hospitals have begun diversion programs to discourage
patients from repeatedly showing up to emergency departments. Id. Some people,
however, view these programs as glorified patient dumping schemes. Id. Additionally, it
is important to note that EMTALA does not contemplate the number of visits a patient is
allowed before its statutory protection becomes ineffective, but its protections would
presumably be renewed upon each time "any individual . . . comes to" a hospital's
emergency department. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).
50. See generally Title II-Role of Public Programs, Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, H.R. 3590 § 2001 (2010) (expanding the role of Medicaid and Medicare under
the new healthcare policies).
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medical facility. Fearing that neither the patient nor her insurance will pay
for the procedure, the hospital decides to transport the patient to the other
medical facility that uses the insured cardiac stints. During the transport to
the hospital covered by the patient's insurance, the patient suffers cardiac
arrest and dies. Does her family have standing to bring a lawsuit in federal
court against the transferring hospital, under the EMTALA stabilization
provision, even though the patient had been admitted to that hospital for
inpatient care? 5'
A. The First and Sixth Circuits'Approach: Inpatients Have Standing to
Bring a Claim under EMTALA
The Sixth Circuit was one of the first federal appellate courts to address
the question of whether EMTALA mandates appropriate medical care
procedures once a patient is admitted to the hospital for inpatient care. In
Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hospital, the plaintiff alleged a violation of
the stabilization requirement of EMTALA when the defendant hospital and
physician failed to stabilize the patient before discharging her. 2 The patient
had been admitted to the hospital's intensive care unit for ten days and an
additional eleven days in general inpatient care for treatment of a stroke.5 3
The intended rehabilitation facility refused to accept the patient "because her
health insurance would not cover the cost."5 4 The physician discharged the
patient to home care, where her condition worsened. In reaching its
conclusion that the EMTALA stabilization requirement does extend to
inpatients, the court focused on two seemingly distinguishable phrases in the
language of EMTALA:
51. This hypothetical also includes another issue that has been subject to much
litigation regarding EMTALA: whether the statute only allows the patient to bring a
lawsuit or whetherfamily members and those impacted by harm to the patient may bring
the claim as well. The Sixth Circuit determined, in the case for which this Note generally
focuses, that family members and those impacted by the patient's harm have standing to
bring a claim under EMTALA based on a plain language reading of the statute. See
Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 581-582 (6th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied sub nom., Providence Hosp. v. Moses, 130 S. Ct. 3499 (2010).
52. 895 F.2d 1131, 1132 (6th Cir. 1990).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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The Act states that the screening must be done for patients who
come to a "hospital emergency room," and that the "hospital" must
give the stabilizing treatment. The rules of statutory construction
suggest that this change in wording indicates a change in meaning.
The reasonable inference from this change in wording is that once
a patient is found to suffer from an emergency medical condition
in the emergency room, she cannot be discharged until the
condition is stabilized, regardless of whether the patient stays in
the emergency room.56
Therefore, the panel's focus in Thornton was on Congress's dropping of
"emergency room" from the language in the stabilization requirement of
EMTALA. According to the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the statute, the
"hospital," and all resources and departments within it, are required to
stabilize the patient's emergency medical condition, regardless of which
department treats the patient, or for how long the hospital undertakes to
provide care for the patient.
The First Circuit indirectly addressed the application of EMTALA to
inpatients nearly a decade later in Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek.58 Here, the panel
addressed a neonatal patient dumping case that arose out of the District of
Puerto Rico. 59 The plaintiffs brought an action under EMTALA after the
defendant physician, without implementing any stabilization procedures,
transferred their newborn son out of the birthing hospital to a hospital with a
more advanced neonatal care unit, where the baby ultimately died.60 The
panel's central focus was on the "comes to" language of EMTALA, and
whether the plaintiffs neonatal son had actually "come to" the hospital by
being bom within it.61 The First Circuit concluded that a newborn does in
fact "come to" a hospital even when he is born inside that hospital, and held
56. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
57. Id. ("[E]mergency care does not always stop when a patient is wheeled from the
emergency room into the main hospital."); but see Thorton, 895 F.2d at 1135 (Jones, J.,
concurring) ("[The Act] was not a measure to force hospitals to provide long-term care
for uninsured patients.").
58. 175 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1999).
59. Id. at 172.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 173-74.
224
6th Circuit Dumps Anti-Dumping Statute
that EMTALA was applicable. 2 The panel went on to apply the
stabilization requirements of EMTALA to the hospital's labor and delivery
department (which is outside of the emergency department) asserting that,
"[w]hile screening is arguably the key to ensuring the health of itinerants
who arrive at an emergency room, stabilization is arguably the key to
ensuring the health of those already admitted to the hospital who develop
emergency medical conditions." 63
The scope of the Thornton and Lopez-Soto decisions taken together
appears to be very broad. The First Circuit determined that EMTALA's
stabilization requirement reaches nearly all patients in a hospital deemed to
have an emergency condition, including inpatients. Additionally, because
the First Circuit determined that the EMTALA stabilization requirement
applies to the entire hospital, the Lopez-Soto decision could arguably apply
to every birth that occurs within a hospital. Furthermore, the First and Sixth
Circuits came to the same conclusion: specifically, that the stabilization
requirement of EMTALA applies to the hospital as a whole, while the
screening requirement is the only provision of EMTALA limited to the
emergency department. Both circuits, therefore, seemed to use a disjunctive
reading of EMTALA, by making a clear distinction between the scope of the
stabilization requirement and the scope of the screening requirement.
B. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits'Approach: Inpatients Do Not Have
Standing to Bring a Claim under EMTALA
Nearly a decade after the enactment of EMTALA, and six years after the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Thornton, the Fourth Circuit had the opportunity
to determine whether the stabilization requirement applies to patients
admitted to a hospital for ongoing inpatient care. In Bryan v. Rectors and
Visitors of the University of Virginia, a Fourth Circuit panel affirmed the
lower court's dismissal of an alleged violation of EMTALA, reasoning that
"Congress's sole purpose in enacting EMTALA was to deal with the
problem of patients being turned away from emergency rooms for non-
medical reasons." 64 In Bryan, one hospital transferred a patient to the
defendant hospital for an emergency respiratory condition.65 The defendant
hospital admitted the patient and treated her condition for approximately
twelve days before refusing any further medical treatment, allegedly against
62. Id. at 174.
63. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
64. 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996).
65. Id. at 350.
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the wishes of the patient's family. 66 Refusing to extend standing to bring an
EMTALA claim to inpatients, the panel found that "[t]he stabilization
requirement is . . . defined entirely in connection with a possible transfer and
without any reference to the patient's long-term care within the system."6 7
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's broad interpretation in Thornton, the Bryan
court's reading of EMTALA is narrow, applying it to the limited "purpose of
ensuring that a hospital undertakes stabilizing treatment for a patient who
arrives with an emergency condition."6 8
For the Fourth Circuit, adopting a broad reading of EMTALA that
requires the hospital "to do much more than merely provide immediate,
emergency stabilizing treatment with appropriate follow-up"69 was
unworkable. 70 Rather, the panel in Bryan read EMTALA to be a "limited
'anti-dumping' statute, not a federal malpractice statute," with its overall
goal being "to get patients into the system who might otherwise go untreated
and be left without a remedy because traditional medical malpractice law
affords no claim for failure to treat." 7' Therefore, according to the Fourth
Circuit, EMTALA was only meant to establish the physician-patient
relationship, and "refusal of treatment after the establishment of a physician-
patient relationship would be regulated by the tort law of the several states,"
not by EMTALA.
66. Id. The hospital's decision not to continue providing the patient with medical
care was based on "internal procedures." Id.
67. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
68. Id. The court concluded its analysis of the scope of EMTALA by asserting "the
stabilization requirement was intended to regulate the hospital's care of the patient only
in the aftermath of the act of admitting her for emergency treatment and while it
considered whether it would undertake longer-term full treatment." Id. at 352.
69. Bryan, 95 F.3d at 351.
70. See id. ("Rather, without regard to professional standards of care or the standards
embodied in the state law of medical malpractice, the hospital would have to provide
treatment indefinitely . .. We do not find this reading of the statute plausible.").
71. Id. (citing Vickers v. Nash. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 142-143 (4th Cir.
1996) and Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hosp., Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993)
(additional citations omitted)).
72. Id. (citing 61 Am.Jur.2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §§ 234, 238
(1981)).
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In 2002, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether EMTALA applies to
inpatients that never fully stabilize from their emergency medical conditions.
Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West involved a chronically ill minor,
who was presented to the defendant's emergency room with a fever and
coughing up blood.7 3 During this initial hospital visit, a treating physician
failed to recognize the underlying condition causing his emergency medical
symptoms, resulting in a misdiagnosis. 74  Subsequently, the hospital
discharged the patient.75  Upon reevaluation of the patient's radiological
tests, a different physician from the same hospital discovered that the patient
had a large lung abscess. 76 The new physician advised the patient's family
of his condition and admitted the patient to the hospital for ongoing
treatment.77 After three days of inpatient treatment, the patient's condition
deteriorated rapidly, prompting the hospital to transfer the patient to a larger
medical facility.78 He was eventually discharged from the second hospital,
but died within a month of his release.79
In Bryant, the panel noted that once a patient's underlying medical
condition is appropriately diagnosed, the hospital has an affirmative
obligation under EMTALA to "stabilize" that particular condition. 8 The
panel, however, appeared to focus on the fact that the patient's emergency
medical condition subsequently worsened, and that he succumbed to his
condition after being transferred to another hospital's intensive care unit.8'
73. Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. The misdiagnosis of the underlying medical condition was not at issue in the
case because, as the panel noted, EMTALA does not apply when a physician makes a
legitimate mistake in rendering emergency medical care. Id. at 1166 (discussing Jackson
v. E. Bay Hosp., 246 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2001)).
75. Id. at 1164.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Bryant, 289 F.3d at 1164.
79. Id. The patient's family brought an EMTALA claim against the hospital that
transferred the patient to the larger medical facility; however, the claim was that the
patient had not been "stabilized," not that the transfer to the larger facility was itself a
violation of EMTALA. Id
80. Id. at 1166.
81. Id. at 1167.
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The patient's family alleged that the transferring hospital failed to stabilize
their son's condition after he was admitted to the hospital and before the
transfer, thereby violating EMTALA. 82  The panel, however, succinctly
noted that "the stabilization requirement normally ends when a patient is
admitted for inpatient care," and upheld the lower court's dismissal of the
charges.83
A close reading of the Bryant opinion indicates that the Ninth Circuit's
rationale for declining to extend EMTALA standing to inpatients is
somewhat different when compared to the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
Bryan. Because the plaintiff in Bryant did not allege that the transfer of the
decedent violated EMTALA, the Ninth Circuit had to determine only
whether EMTALA applied during the delayed hospitalization. 84 Thus, the
Bryant panel reached two conclusions that seem contradictory: first, that the
hospital's duty to "stabilize" under EMTALA "appears to reach a patient's
care after the patient is admitted to a hospital for treatment";85 and second,
that "the term 'stabilize' was not intended to apply to those individuals who
are admitted to a hospital for inpatient care."86 The distinction for the panel
came from the absence of an improper transfer from the emergency room,
which would normally serve as the trigger for any EMTALA compliance
analysis. According to Bryant, a patient who is treated in the emergency
room, even if improperly so, is not protected under EMTALA once he or she
becomes an inpatient because the statute is only designed to ensure that the
emergency medical patient is not inappropriately turned away from the
medical treatment system.88 Inpatients, as recipients of extended medical
treatment, are part of the medical treatment system and would not be the
82. Id. at 1165-66.
83. Bryant, 289 F.3d at 1167, 1170.
84. Id. at 1165-66.
85. Id. at 1167.
86. Id.
87. See id at 1167 ("[T]he term ['stabilize'] is defined only in connection with the
transfer of an emergency room patient.") (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
88. Bryant, 289 F.3d at 1167-68 (discussing Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ.
of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) and Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d
1131, 1131 (6th Cir. 1990)).
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intended recipients of any EMTALA protections. Accordingly, inpatients
are unable to bring a claim for a potential violation of the statute.89
Thus, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, in addressing the issue of whether
EMTALA would continue to apply once an emergency room patient with an
emergency medical condition was admitted for inpatient care, each came to
the same general interpretation of EMTALA: to provide access to the
emergency medical care system. 90  Accordingly, in the opinion of these
circuits, an inpatient receiving ongoin medical care does not need the
protections established under EMTALA.
IV. THE 2003 REGULATIONS BY THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES
In 1998, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on a
case addressing the proper interpretation of a specific EMTALA provision.92
However, even though the application of EMTALA to inpatients was a
central focus of oral arguments, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the
89. See id. at 1169 ("Once [the hospital] admitted [the patient] for inpatient care,
EMTALA no longer applied."). The Eleventh Circuit followed similar reasoning in
Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2002), which was decided in the same year
as Bryant. The panel in Harry asserted that EMTALA was enacted "to guarantee patient
entry into the medical system via mandatory appropriate medical screenings and
stabilization prior to transfer." Id. at 773. The panel explained that without the existence
of a "transfer," there cannot be any violation of EMTALA as the patient would have been
allowed access to the medical system. Id. at 774-75.
90. Bryan, 95 F.3d at 351; Bryant, 289 F.3d at 1165.
91. Consider the scenario of the heart attack patient. See supra Part Ill. Under the
approach of the Harry panel, the patient (or her executors) would likely not have
standing. Harry, 291 F.3d at 775. Any other reading of Harry would give an ambiguous
result. There is no doubt that EMTALA would apply to a patient refused care by the
emergency department. Id. at 768. Based on the Harry decision, the EMTALA
provisions end upon admission as an inpatient. The refusal of further care of an inpatient
(i.e. the "transfer" or "dumping" of that inpatient), could not be said to "jumpstart" or in
some way bring back the provisions of EMTALA as some may argue could be a possible
reading of the Harry decision. To do so would create a complex statutory scheme well
beyond the overall goal of the statute, which is to provide access to the emergency
medical care system for all individuals.
92. Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999).
93. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-45, Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc.,
525 U.S. 249 (1999) (No. 97-53) (showing a significant number of questions and
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issue because it was improperly preserved on appeal.94  The inconsistent
application of EMTALA to inpatients across the federal circuits and the
Supreme Court's restraint from curing the circuit split prompted CMS to
promulgate regulations on the issue of whether inpatients have standing to
bring an EMTALA claim.95 While CMS initially proposed regulations that
agreed with the First and Sixth Circuits' interpretations of the inpatient
standing issue, the regulations that CMS ultimately enacted reflected the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits' interpretations.
A. The 2002 Draft Proposals by CMS
In May 2002, CMS published its proposed changes to the inpatient
payment systems, and included a 6proposed rule regarding the application of
EMTALA to hospital inpatients.9 The proposed rule sought to advance the
theory presented by the Sixth Circuit in Thornton; CMS believed that "the
hospital continues to be obligated under [EMTALA] irrespective of the
inpatient admission." 97 Accordingly, CMS contended that failure to extend
protections to inpatients "would provide an obvious means of circumventing
[EMTALA] requirements that would seemingly contradict the point of the
statute to protect emergency patient health and safety." 98 Inherent in this
assertion is the federal circuits' split over what CMS simply deduced as "the
point of the statute." On one side, CMS and the First and Sixth Circuits
argued that the overall purpose of EMTALA is to provide ongoing care for
all who seek emergency medical care;99 on the other side, the Fourth and
arguments on the applicability of EMTALA to inpatients admitting through a hospital's
emergency department).
94. Roberts, 525 U.S. at 253-54.
95. Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year
2003 Rates, 67 Fed. Reg. 31404, 31475 (proposed May 9, 2002) [hereinafter Changes]
(not codified as proposed).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id ("[O]nce a hospital has incurred an EMTALA obligation with respect to an
individual, that obligation continues while the individual remains at the hospital . . . .");
Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[E]mergency care
does not always stop when a patient is wheeled from the emergency room into the main
hospital . . . Emergency care must be given until the patient's emergency medical
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Ninth Circuits contended that the overall purpose is to ensure that all persons
are treated equally at the initial stage of medical care, when seeking
emergency medical care.1oo
The proposed CMS regulation directed that inpatient coverage under
EMTALA would only apply when an inpatient is admitted through the
emergency department of the hospital.' 0' Accordingly, the regulations
would not apply to inpatients that enter through other avenues, such as
previously scheduled surgical procedures.102 Interestingly, CMS noted that,
while the legislative history of EMTALA included many references to
patients' being denied emergency medical treatment, there were no
references to inpatients being denied similar medical care.io3 As shown
below, this point has become a basis for arguing that EMTALA should not
be applicable once a patient attains inpatient status.
B. The 2003 Final Rule Adopted by CMS
After it received comments on its proposed regulations of EMTALA,
CMS promulated its final rule in 2003 in the Code of Federal
Regulations. In language contrary to its original proposal a year earlier,
CMS codified the following as its official EMTALA regulation:
(2) Exception: Application to inpatients. (i) If a hospital has
screened an individual under paragraph (a) of this section and
found the individual to have an emergency medical condition, and
admits that individual as an inpatient in good faith in order to
condition is stabilized."); Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1999)
("[EMTALA] unambiguously imposes certain duties on covered hospitals vis-A-vis any
victim of a detected medical emergency, regardless of. . . where within the walls he may
be when the hospital identifies the problem.").
100. Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996)
("[EMTALA's] core purpose is to get patients into the system who might otherwise go
untreated and be left without a remedy because traditional malpractice law affords no
claim for failure to treat."); Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("We hold that EMTALA's stabilization requirement ends when an individual
is admitted for inpatient care.").
101. Changes, supra note 95.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 31,475.
104. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2) (2009).
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stabilize the emergency medical condition, the hospital has
satisfied its special responsibilities under this section with respect
to that individual.0 5
CMS's earlier concern - that any failure to extend protection to inpatients
entering through the emergency room would create another route for patient
dumping - was largely disregarded in the language of the enacted
regulation. 106 According to the final version of the regulation, an inpatient,
regardless of how he or she reaches that status, is not owed any special
treatment or care under EMTALA, and thus does not have standing to bring
a claim thereunder.' 0 7 Thus, the language of the final rule rejected the broad
interpretation and holdings in Thornton and Lopez-Soto; 0 8 instead, the
regulation favored the much stricter statutory interpretation of EMTALA
adopted in Bryan and Bryant.109
C. Reasoning for Reversal of the Draft CMS Interpretation
CMS's major shift in statutory interpretation required significant
explanation, which CMS attempted to provide in an EMTALA-clarifying
publication in the Federal Register."o CMS discussed many comments it
had received that criticized its intent to extend EMTALA obligations of a
hospital to any inpatient."' Several comments focused on the "extensive
[Medicare conditions of participation] responsibilities with respect to
105. Id. at § 489.24(d)(2)(i) (second emphasis added).
106. Compare Changes, supra note 95 (asserting its concern that "permitting inpatient
admission to end EMTALA would provide an obvious means of circumventing
[EMTALA] requirements"), with 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2) (asserting that once a hospital
admits a patient "in good faith," it satisfies its requirements under EMTALA).
107. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2).
108. Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990); Lopez-Soto
v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 1999).
109. Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir.
1996); Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002).
110. See Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of
Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals with Emergency Medical
Conditions; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,222 (proposed Sept. 9, 2003) [hereinafter
Medicare Program] (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 413, 482, 489).
111. Id. at 53,244.
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inpatients."ll 2 These conditions of participation (CoPs) ensure that a patient
admitted to a hospital, regardless of whether it was through the emergency
department, receives sufficient medical care to meet his underlying medical
needs.'" CMS explained that, if applied to inpatients, EMTALA would no
longer serve as a procedural medical safeguard to persons with emergency
medical conditions, but would instead act as a malpractice statute, which it
was never intended to do.'14
The clarifying publication of 2003 also addressed certain comments that
questioned the factual knowledge of CMS regarding "patient dumping"
generally." 5 These criticisms asserted "that CMS has 'no evidence there is a
current problem' for the dumping of inpatients with emergency medical
conditions."ll6 Additionally, as noted in the original proposal by CMS, no
Congressional records demonstrate a problem with dumping inpatients with
emergency medical conditions, only those who arrived at emergency
departments." 7
The Ninth Circuit decision in Bryant v. Adventist Health, which came out
shortly after the original CMS proposal was published,' 18 appeared to be a
heavily weighted factor for CMS in reversing its proposed regulation." 9
Based upon comments that argued for the adoption of Bryant as a nation-
112. Id.
113. Id.at 53,244-45.
114. Id. at 53,244.
115. Id
116. See Medicare Program, supra note 110 (quoting an unidentified commentator to
the proposal published in 67 Fed. Reg. 31,404 (May 9, 2002)).
117. See Changes, supra note 95 ("[T]he legislative history of EMTALA is replete
with references to the problem of individuals denied emergency medical care at hospital
emergency rooms, whereas there is no explicit reference to similar problems faced by
hospital inpatients.") (citing 131 Cong. Rec. 28,587, 28,588 (1985)).
118. CMS published its original proposal for EMTALA regulations on May 9, 2002,
while the Ninth Circuit reported its decision in Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West on
May 20, 2002.
119. See Changes, supra note 95 ("Several commenters cited the recent ruling by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bryant v. Adventist Health System . . . that
EMTALA generally ceases to apply once an individual is admitted for inpatient care;
these commenters believed we should adopt the opinion for the national policy.").
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wide policy, CMS constructed an agreeable policy: "[S]hould a hospital
determine that it would be better to admit the individual as an inpatient, such
a decision would not result in either a transfer or discharge, and
consequently, the hospital would not have an obligation to stabilize under
EMTALA."1 20 After weighing the comments, federal court interpretations,
and the availability of CoPs to ensure that appropriate medical care would be
provided to inpatients with emergency medical conditions, CMS determined
it would "[interpret] hospital obligations under EMTALA as ending once the
individuals are admitted to the hospital inpatient care."l 21
V. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REJECTION OF THE 2003 ANTI-DUMPING
REGULATIONS
In late 2008, the Sixth Circuit heard arguments in Moses v. Providence
Hospital & Medical Centers, Inc., a case considering the application of
EMTALA when the patient had been admitted to a hospital for testing as
well as continuing psychiatric care. 122 The case was on appeal from the
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which had granted
summary judgment for the defendant hospital.123 In addressing the divide
between its own prior interpretations of EMTALAl24 and the more recently
promulgated CMS regulations,125 the Sixth Circuit had two options: the
panel could adopt the CMS final regulations as the official interpretation of
EMTALA and reject further use of Thornton on the issue of inpatient
standing; or the panel could follow its own precedent in Thornton, and in so
doing, downplay the application of the CMS regulations.
120. See Medicare Program, supra note I10.
121. Id. at 53,244-45.
122. Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 575-77 (6th Cir.
2009).
123. Id. at 577.
124. See generally Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1131 (6th Cir.
1990) (interpreting EMTALA to apply to inpatients for as long as the patient's
emergency medical condition has not been stabilized).
125. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2) (2009) (interpreting EMTALA to apply
only while a person with an emergency medical condition is in the emergency
department, but not when that patient is admitted for inpatient care).
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A. Background to Moses v. Providence Hospital
After Christopher Howard began exhibiting serious physical and
psychological symptoms of illness, his wife, Marie Moses-Irons, brought
him to Providence Hospital for treatment.126 The hospital staff admitted
Howard to conduct more tests in order to determine the source of his
symptoms.127 An examining physician ruled out "an acute psychotic
episode" as being among the initial possibilities.128 Four days later, a
psychiatrist determined that Howard was not stable psychiatrically, and
sought to have Howard admitted to the hospital's psychiatric unit with a
diagnosis of "atypical psychosis" and "depression." The hospital staff,
however, did not admit Howard to the psychiatric unit and prepared him for
discharge just one day later.130 While the discharging physician noted that
Marie Moses-Irons feared her husband, he nevertheless determined that
Howard was stable and could be properly discharged without further
psychiatric care.'3 Ten days after his discharge from Providence Hospital,
Howard murdered his wife, presumably due to his ongoing mental health
condition.132 Johnella Richmond Moses, acting as representative for the
estate of Marie Moses-Irons, subsequently brought a claim against the
126. Moses, 561 F.3d at 576. Among the symptoms he was exhibiting, Irons had
"severe headaches, muscle soreness, high blood pressure[,] vomiting . . . slurred speech,
disorientation, hallucinations, and delusions." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (internal citations to the record omitted). In granting summary judgment for
the defendant, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan asserted that the
physicians never actually diagnosed Irons with an emergency medical condition as
required by EMTALA; however, the Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, determining
that "[a] legitimate possibility that the patient might commit suicide would appear to
'place the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy,' and could thus fall under the
category of 'emergency medical condition."' Id. at 585-86 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i)).
129. Id. at 576.
130. Moses, 561 F.3d at 576.
131. Id at 576-77.
132. Id. at 577.
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hospital and two physicians for violating the stabilization procedural
requirement of EMTALA. 133
The District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
asserting that "[t]he patient was undisputedly completely screened, as the
statute requires, even if on the basis of a wrong diagnosis; and he was
thereafter admitted to the Defendant hospital, and no emergency medical
condition was recognized on the screening."l 34 On appeal, a panel of Sixth
Circuit judges determined, inter alia, that Howard did, in fact, have an
emergency medical condition at the time he was admitted, 135 and that the
plaintiffs, as third-party representatives, did have standing under
EMTALA. 136 The panel's more controversial holding, and the central focus
of this Note, was its disregard of the CMS regulations and its determination
that the defendant hospital had been required to ensure that Howard, even as
an inpatient, was stabilized under EMTALA before discharge.' Over a
strongly worded dissent, the Sixth Circuit later denied a petition for an en
banc rehearing on the issue of inpatient standing.' The Supreme Court
denied certiorari on June 28, 2010.
B. The Sixth Circuit's Analysis of EMtTALA Stabilization Requirements and
Rejection of the CMS Regulations Regarding Inpatients
In reaching its conclusions, the Moses panel relied heavily on the Sixth
Circuit's earlier decision in Thornton.'4  Before discussing Thornton,
however, the Moses panel independently determined that EMTALA:
133. Id
134. Id. at 578.
135. Id. at 585-86.
136. Moses, 561 F.3d at 582.
137. See id. at 584.
138. See Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc., 573 F.3d 397, 398 (6th Cir.
2009) (Griffin, J., dissenting) ("The majority has perpetuated a serious conflict between
our circuit and the Ninth Circuit . .. the Fourth Circuit . .. the federal regulations . .. and
the vast majority of lower court decisions.") (internal citations omitted).
139. Providence Hosp. v. Moses, 130 S. Ct. 3499 (2010).
140. Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 582 (6th Cir.
2009); see also Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1990)
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requires "such treatment as may be required to stabilize the
medical condition," and forbids the patient's release unless his
condition has 'been stabilized.' A patient with an emergency
medical condition is "stabilized" when "no material deterioration
of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to
result from or occur during" the patient's release from the hospital.
Thus, EMTALA requires a hospital to treat a patient with an
emergency condition in such a way that, upon thepatient's release,
no further deterioration of the condition is likely.
Based on the final sentence of this passage, it appears that the Moses panel
adopted the disjunctive method of reading the statute used in Thornton.142
The panel interpreted EMTALA's protections to be initiated upon a patient's
arrival at the hospital and to end only when the patient is fully stabilized,
irrespective of whether the atient has been admitted to inpatient care for
ongoing medical treatment.
The Sixth Circuit had to justify its use of Thornton and its broad
interpretation of EMTALA in light of the narrow interpretation proffered in
the recent CMS regulations.144 The defendant, Providence Hospital, relied
heavily upon the CMS regulations and argued that once Moses was admitted
to the hospital, the s ecial stabilization requirements under EMTALA were
no longer in force.' However, as the panel noted, the CMS regulations
(determining that EMTALA requirements do not end once the patient is admitted to the
hospital for ongoing inpatient care).
141. Moses, 561 F.3d at 582 (citations omitted).
142. Compare id (providing several different subsections of EMTALA to
demonstrate the statutory procedural process) with Thornton, 95 F.2d at 1134
(distinguishing a separate meaning among the terms "hospital emergency room" and
"hospital").
143. Moses, 561 F.3d at 582.
144. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24 (d)(2) (refusing to extend EMTALA to individuals with
emergency medical conditions who become inpatients during their care).
145. Moses, 561 F.3d at 582. Interestingly, just prior to reaching the Defendant
hospital's argument based on the final CMS regulations, the panel stated that "the statute
requires more than the admission and further testing of a patient; it requires actual care,
or treatment, be provided as well. Accordingly, Defendants could not satisfy their
EMTALA obligations merely by screening Howard and admitting him to conduct further
testing." Id. The panel could have simply determined that no proper "treatment"
occurred upon the admission of Moses and the panel did not need to discuss the CMS
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regarding inpatient standin were not yet in effect at the time of the incidents
leading to the Moses case. 6 Relying upon case law precedent, the Moses
panel concluded that applying the CMS regulations would be improper
because "courts should not construe congressional enactments and
administrative rules . . . to have retroactive effect unless their language
requires this result."14 7
Instead of simply rejecting the CMS regulations for their procedural
inapplicability in the Moses case, the panel seized its opportunity to attack
the regulations that were contrary to its prior holding in Thornton.148 Even
when provided an opportunity to find a "bad faith" basis for admission by
the hospital,149 the panel moved forward with attacking the reliability of the
regulations.150 The Sixth Circuit panel stated that "[t]he CMS rule appears
contrary to EMTALA's plain language, which requires a hospital to 'provide
. . . for such further medical examination and such treatment as may be
required to stabilize the medical condition."" 5 ' By focusing on the term
"treatment," and asserting that the obligation to treat continues until the
emergency condition is stabilized, the panel concluded that "a hospital may
not release a patient with an emergency medical condition without first
determining that the patient has actually stabilized, even if the hospital
Regulations. The Sixth Circuit, however, seemed eager to address the regulations and
offer its wholehearted disapproval thereof Id. at 583-84.
146. Id. at 583.
147. Id. (quoting BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. S.E. Tel., Inc., 462 F.3d 650, 657 (6th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted)).
148. Id. The Moses panel discussed the applicability of the CMS Regulations after it
had refused to give any Chevron deference to it. Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med.
Ctrs., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 582-84 (6th Cir. 2009). However, for the purposes of this Note,
it is important to consider the possible procedural method by which the Sixth Circuit
could have addressed and rejected applying the CMS Regulation rather than attacking its
overall credibility. Accordingly, this Note considers the procedural aspect addressed by
the Moses panel prior to the panel's discussion of the overall correctness of the
Regulation.
149. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24 (d)(2)(i) (requiring that admission of a patient as an
inpatient must be done in "good faith" in order to satisfy the special requirements under
EMTALA).
150. Moses, 561 F.3d at 583.
151. Id. at 583 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (emphasis in original)).
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properly admitted the patient.,,152 In applying the rule established in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., which
allows the rejection of administrative regulations contrary to legislative
intent or based on impermissible statutory construction,' 53 the Moses panel
refused to give deference to the CMS regulation it deemed to be "contrary to
the plain language of the statute." 54
Rejecting the CMS regulation and accepting the holding in Thornton, the
panel ultimately held that "defendants are not entitled to summary judgment
simply on the ground that the hospital admitted Howard as an inpatient and
subjected him to several days of testing," and remanded the case.
C. Implications of the Court's Holding
Inherent in the panel's reasoning in Moses are several important points
that the Sixth Circuit accepts without providing any clear basis for doing so.
Before analyzing what steps may be taken to remedy the ongoing split
between the federal circuits regarding inpatients and EMTALA, it is critical
to understand these points and the effect the Moses decision will have on
them.
i. Presumption of Bad Faith by Participating Hospitals
One assumption that the Thornton panel struggled over, and one that the
Moses panel inherently accepted, is that hospitals would unquestionably and
deceitfully admit indigent patients from the emergency department only to
dump them a short time later.156 CMS also considered this possibility, but
created a workable standard in its final EMTALA regulations rather than
152. Id.
153. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
154. Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 583 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gallagher v. Croghan Colonial Bank, 89 F.3d 275, 278 (6th Cir. 1996)).
155. Id. at 584.
156. See Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990)
("Hospitals may not circumvent the requirements of [EMTALAI merely by admitting an
emergency room patient to the hospital, then immediately discharging that patient."); see
also Moses, 561 F.3d at 582 ("In the case of most emergency conditions, it is
unreasonable to believe that such treatment could be provided by admitting the patient
and then discharging him.").
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giving automatic standing to all inpatients.' 57 The Sixth Circuit feared that
surreptitious patient admission would occur frequently if EMTALA did not
require stabilization of inpatients admitted through the emergency
department. As a result, Thornton, Moses, and the initial CMS proposal
all determined such mischievous admissions of inpatients to be against the
congressional intent of EMTALA, and thus extended its obligations to cover
inpatients as well as emergency room patients.159
The problem with this assumption is, as noted in both the proposed
regulations and the comments referenced in the 2003 CMS final regulation
publication, there are neither examples nor any relevant data to suggest that
such practices have occurred or would otherwise occur.160 Accordingly, this
is an extreme concern and shows distrust of hospital emergency
departments.161 To presume that a hospital will risk exposing itself to the
extensive requirements of CoPs for inpatients,162 as well as state malpractice
liabilities, implies complete inadequacy by emergency departments.
157. See Changes, supra note 95 ("[W]e emphasize that an admission to inpatient
status cannot be used to evade EMTALA responsibilities."); but see Medicare Program,
supra note 110 at 53,245 ("If it is discovered upon investigation of a specific situation
that a hospital did not admit an individual in good faith with the intention of providing
treatment ... then liability under EMTALA may attach.").
158. Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1135 (holding EMTALA applies to inpatients immediately
after asserting hospitals cannot circumvent EMTALA through temporary admission as
inpatients).
159. See Changes, supra note 95 ("[W]e emphasize that an admission to inpatient
status cannot be used to evade EMTALA responsibilities.").
160. Id.; see also Medicare Program, supra note 110 ("Two commenters stated that
CMS has 'no evidence there is a current problem' for the dumping of inpatients with
emergency medical conditions.").
161. See Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002)
(refusing to accept the assumption "that hospitals use the admission process as a
subterfuge to circumvent the stabilization requirement.").
162. See Medicare Program, supra note I 10 at 53,245 (providing an example of a CoP
that "includes specific procedural requirements that must be satisfied to show that there
has been adequate consideration given to a patient's need for post-discharge care," which
is not provided for in EMTALA).
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EMTALA was enacted to stop the practice of failure to initiate treatment,'63
as state law had been sporadic in creating a cause of action to handle such
situations.164 To presume that a hospital would try to alleviate one federal
obligation in EMTALA by exposing itself to more federal regulations and
CoPs, as well as to other state regulations through malpractice claims, not
only does a disservice to the integrity of the medical community as a whole,
but also ignores the overall intent of EMTALA: to fill the legal gap in
providing equal access to emergency medical care.
ii. Redefining "Patient Dumping"
When Representative Stark introduced the provisions of EMTALA into
COBRA, he understood "patient dumping" to be the act of turning away or
refusing to initiate emergency medical care to indigent and uninsured
persons.165 However, the type of patient dumping that the Sixth Circuit
seeks to protect in Moses is not the initial refusal of medical care by a
hospital's emergency department, but a type of dumping that may be best
described as "downstream" patient dumping. This type of dumping, as
demonstrated in the facts of Moses,166 would occur when a hospital refuses
to stabilize or treat the medical condition of an inpatient that enters through
the emergency room.
By merging the concept of patient dumping with an act that may occur at
any time in the medical care continuum, the Sixth Circuit readily applied
EMTALA to an inpatient that was discharged without ever being fully
167
stabilized. However, this expansion of patient dumping is unsupported by
163. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. I, at 27 ("The Committee is most concerned that
medically unstable patients are not being treated appropriately. There have been reports
of situations where treatment was simply not provided.").
164. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. III, at 5 ("Although at least 22 states have enacted
statutes or issued regulations requiring the provision of limited medical services
whenever an emergency situation exists . . . some are convinced that the problem needs to
be addressed by federal sanctions."); see also Bryant, 289 F.3d at 1168-69 ("Congress
enacted EMTALA to create a new cause of action, generally unavailable under state tort
law, for what amounts to failure to treat and not to duplicate preexisting legal
protections.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
165. See 131 CONG. REC. 35,813, supra note 3 (discussing specific cases of patients
being turned away from emergency departments).
166. Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir.
2009).
167. Id. at 584.
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the history of patient dumping, and causes the application of EMTALA to
inpatients to be much more difficult. When enacting EMTALA, Congress
did not contemplate applying it to "downstream" patient dumping; instead
Congress intended it only to initiate care in the medical system.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit's redefinition of what it means to "dump" a
patient creates an imbalance in the law: if a person comes through the
emergency department but is later "dumped" as an inpatient for insufficient
payment, EMTALA applies. But if a person enters the hospital for a
scheduled medical procedure and is later "dumped" as an inpatient for
insufficient payment, EMTALA does not apply. This approach implies
too great a difference between inpatients that originally enter through the
emergency department and inpatients that enter the hospital through other
avenues.
VI. THE NEXT STEPS
A. The Supreme Court's Denial of Certiorari
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in the Moses case,170 likely
due to an amicus brief of the United States.'7 1 In its brief, the United States
requested that the Court refuse to hear the case because "[t]he conflict
among the circuits is shallow" and because "[the Department of Health and
Human Services] has committed to initiating rulemaking to reconsider the
issue in the coming year." 72 However, as of November 2010, there have
168. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. III, at 5 ("In recent years there has been a growing
concern about the provision of adequate emergency room medical services to individuals
who seek care, particularly as to the indigent and uninsured.") (emphasis added); see also
Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996)
("[EMTALA's] core purpose is to get patients into the system who might otherwise go
untreated and be left without a remedy because traditional medical malpractice law
affords no claim for failure to treat.").
169. See Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002)
(providing a similar analysis when comparing the Thornton decision to James v. Sunrise
Hosp., 86 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1996)).
170. Providence Hosp. v. Moses, 130 S.Ct. 3499 (2010).
171. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Providence Hosp. v.
Moses, 130 S.Ct. 3499 (2010) (No. 09-438) (requesting the Court deny certiorari to the
Sixth Circuit).
172. Id
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been no proposed changes to the current regulation 73 published in the
Federal Register by CMS.
The government's suggestion that the Supreme Court refrain from
granting certiorari and reviewing the EMTALA inpatient regulation in Title
42 of the Code of Federal Regulations at Part 489.24 ma represent a
genuine interest of the government to rework the regulation.4 More than
likely, however, given that the United States argued "[t]he [Sixth Circuit]
erred in holding that EMTALA's coverage unambiguously continues after
an individual has been admitted in good faith to the hospital as an
inpatient,"' 7 5 the request for denial of certiorari might be posturing by the
United States to prevent the Supreme Court from siding with the Sixth
Circuit and striking down the CMS regulation. A delayed review by the
Supreme Court would not only allow the courts of appeals to support the
CMS position of limiting EMTALA upon admission as an inpatient, 6 but it
will also allow CMS to reword the regulation while keeping the same
general scope of EMTALA.
Additionally, while the United States categorized the divide among the
circuits as "shallow,"' 7 7 it is difficult to accept that position. Two similarly-
situated persons in different jurisdictions will have different abilities to bring
a claim under EMTALA.178 A person who alleges an act of "downstream"
patient dumping has standing to bring a claim under EMTALA in Detroit,
173. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2) (2010).
174. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 171, at 9 (stating
that the Department of Health and Human Services is planning to initiate rulemaking to
address the issue of inpatient standing).
175. Id.
176. Many federal district courts have given favorable weight to the CMS regulation
of EMTALA's application to inpatients since its implementation in 2003, though the
Sixth Circuit is the only appellate court to discuss the regulations. See, e.g., Morgan v.
N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 403 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1129 n.14 (S.D. Ala. 2005), aff'd, 225 Fed.
Appx. 828 (1Ith Cir. 2007) (per curiam), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1098 (2008).
177. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 171 at 9.
178. Moses v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 584 (6th Cir. 2009)
(overturning the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the hospital and allowing
the EMTALA claim to move forward); Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d
1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a hospital is entitled to summary judgment in an
EMTALA claim brought by the family of an individual who had been admitted into
inpatient care).
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but would lack standing in Los Angeles. Such a divide cannot be described
as "shallow," but instead represents a major discrepancy in the interpretation
of the scope of EMTALA.
B. A Possible Proactive Resolution
In light of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Moses, the conflict
among the circuits will only be fully resolved when one of two things
happens: either the Supreme Court eventually grants certiorari on the
EMTALA inpatient issue, or Congress amends the text of EMTALA to
clarify its intent. It may be years before the Supreme Court grants certiorari
on this issue, provided that CMS will likely reword its 2003 regulations of
the EMTALA issue, and will probably retain the overall position that
inpatients do not have standing to bring a claim under EMTALA. Given the
Sixth Circuit's express rejection of that position,179 it is foreseeable that new
language with the same purpose will not convince the Sixth Circuit to
deviate from Thornton and Moses and accept a CMS regulation excluding
inpatients from EMTALA's coverage. Therefore, the best and most
proactive solution is for Congress to address the divide and clarify the
appropriate scope for applying the protections of EMTALA. As discussed
above, EMTALA is limited in its scope, and Congress would be correct to
adopt the language, or at least the general intent, of the currently enacted
CMS regulations as an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b). Below is a
proposed version of a portion of EMTALA, with the additional content in
italics and underlined:
UNITED STATES CODE
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare
Chapter 7. Social Security Act
Title XVIII. Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled
Part E. Miscellaneous Provisions
§ 1395dd. Examination and treatment for emergency medical conditions
and women in labor.
(b) Necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency medical conditions and
labor.
(1) In general. If any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under
this title) comes to a hospital's emergency department and the hospital's
emergency department determines that the individual has an emergency
medical condition, the hospital's emergency department must provide either
(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital and
subject to subsection (1)(C). for such further medical examination
179. Moses, 561 F.3d. at 584.
244
6th Circuit Dumps Anti-Dumping Statute
and treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition,
or
(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in
accordance with subsection (c).
(C) Inpatient exemption from stabilization requirement. If the
hospital's emergency department determines an emergency medical
condition to exist and admits the patient into the hospital as an
inpatient in order to provide additional medical treatment and any
additional necessary medical testing, the hospital satisfies its special
requirements under this section.' so
This Note's proposed amendment to EMTALA rejects the decision in
Moses and officially adopts the polic assertions of the current CMS
policy,isi as well as those of the Fourth 2 and Ninth Circuits. Under this
proposed amendment, the protections of EMTALA would only apply to
emergency rooms and serve as a means of providing all patients access to
the emergency medical services system. By enacting EMTALA, Congress
sought to correct the problem of emergency departments' refusing to treat
patients who do not have medical insurance. Congress corrected the
problem by requiring all CMS-participating hospitals to provide emergency
medical screenings to all those who seek emergency care, and to begin the
steps of necessary treatment should any emergency medical conditions be
found.184 Extending the treatment and stabilization requirement of
EMTALA to inpatients strikes against the gap-filling nature of the statute
and impedes upon already-existing medical treatment requirements through
state law and federal regulations.' 8 Since Congress is in the best position to
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (italicized and underlined text added as proposed
amendment).
181. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2)(i).
182. See Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir.
1996) ("The stabilization requirement is thus defined entirely in connection with a
possible transfer and without any reference to the patient's long-term care within the
system.").
183. See Bryant, 289 F.3d at 1167 ("['Stabilize'] is defined only in connection with
the transfer of an emergency room patient.") (emphasis added).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1).
185. See 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 90 (2005) (citing case law showing that
physicians are "not liable for arbitrarily refusing to respond to a call or render treatment,"
but are liable once a relationship is established for "failure to possess the requisite skill,
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provide meaningful clarity as to the original intent of EMTALA, it is now
time for Congress to resolve the split among the federal circuits and
appropriately amend the statute.
care, and diligence as a result of which the patient is injured or for failure to exercise their
best judgment, resulting in injuries to the patient.").
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